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— Note —
What Carpenter Tells Us About
When a Fourth Amendment Search
of Metadata Begins
“Given the advancing state of both the remote sensing art and the
capacity of computers to handle an uninterrupted and synoptic data
flow, there seem to be no physical barriers left to shield us from
intrusion.” 1
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1.

United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 757 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(quoting Arthur R. Miller, The Assault on Privacy 46 (1971)).
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Introduction
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable
government searches by requiring the government to procure a warrant
supported by probable cause that “particularly describe[es] the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,” prior to searching
persons or their homes, papers, or effects. 2 Traditionally, the Supreme
Court’s conception of the Fourth Amendment’s protection was tied to
physical space. The government could not seek information in an indiv–
idual’s constitutionally protected areas (e.g., one’s home or office) with–
out first acquiring that individual’s permission or obtaining a warrant.3
This made sense because people stored private information in private
spaces, and private and public spaces were usually delineated by clear,
physical boundaries. But as technology has advanced, the constit–
utionally-protected-area conception of the Fourth Amendment fails to
provide adequate protection for that private information that is now
stored, communicated, and generated digitally.
Recognizing this technological shift in 1967, the Supreme Court in
Katz v. United States 4 adopted the view that “the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places.” 5 In doing so, the Court laid down a new
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test that is not confined to constit–
utionally protected areas or tangible things, but extends outside of the
home and office to cover electronic and digital information and other
communications to which an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy. 6
Today, over fifty years after Katz, the reasonable-expectation-ofprivacy test has become an even more vital safeguard against
unreasonable government intrusions that are due, in large part, to the
Internet. As one observer noted, “the Internet is not some standalone,
separate domain where a few of life’s functions are carried out. . . .
Rather, it is the . . . place where virtually everything is done. It is . . .
where the most private data is created and stored.” 7 In fact, “more data
has been created [in the years 2014 and 2015] than in the entire previous
2.

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.

3.

Jones v. United States, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012).

4.

389 U.S. 347 (1967).

5.

Id. at 351.

6.

Id. at 352–53.

7.

Glenn Greenwald, No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the
NSA, and the U.S. Surveillance State 5–6 (2014).
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history of the human race.” 8 And the amount of data that is created
and stored on the Internet continues to grow exponentially: by 2020,
“about 1.7 megabytes of new information will be created every second
for every human being on the planet.” 9
The data we produce using digital devices fall into two categories:
content—the substance of digital communications and activities—and
metadata—data about content. 10 While the content of our digital
activities is generally agreed to be subject to Fourth Amendment prote–
ction, 11 some have argued that metadata is not. In 2013, following
Edward Snowden’s revelation that the National Security Agency was
collecting metadata about U.S. citizens on a massive scale, Senator
Dianne Feinstein argued that metadata is not protected under the
Fourth Amendment. 12 She reasoned that, because the records being
collected did not include content, names, or locations, their collection
did not qualify as surveillance. 13
But while it is true that metadata on its face is almost meaningless
to most people, it can, when analyzed, reveal the most intimate details
of our lives. Our digital-activity records create information-rich “meta–
data trails” that, because of metadata’s structured nature, can “often
yield information more easily than . . . the actual content of our
communications.” 14 And the greater the quantity of metadata analyzed,
the more revealing it can be. Large datasets can be used for everything
from mapping an individual’s location over a period of years, to identi–
fying a person’s relationships, habits, and behaviors. 15 This previously
inaccessible source of information has the potential to make the govern–

8.

Bernard Marr, Big Data: 20 Mind-Boggling Facts Everyone Must Read, Forbes
(Sept. 30, 2015, 2:19 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/
2015/09/30/big-data-20-mind-boggling-facts-everyone-must-read/#27f04f
2117b1 [https://perma.cc/R4RM-PCLS].

9.

Id.

10.

Greenwald, supra note 7, at 132.

11.

See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352; Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979)
(accepting Katz’s holding that a communication’s content is subject to
Fourth Amendment protection).

12.

Dianne Feinstein, Continue NSA Call-Records Program, USA Today
(Oct. 20, 2013, 6:22 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/
10/20/nsa-call-records-program-sen-dianne-feinstein-editorials-debates/
3112715/ [https://perma.cc/4AAL-LFXK].

13.

Id.

14.

Declaration of Professor Edward W. Felten at ¶¶ 1, 20, ACLU v. Clapper,
959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 13-3994).

15.

Id. at ¶ 24.
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ment practically omniscient—and it is widely agreed that “police
omniscience is one of the most effective tools of tyranny.” 16
But to hold the government accountable for analyzing our
metadata, we must revisit one of the Fourth Amendment’s fundamental
questions: When does the search begin? 17 This question is important
because it determines not only at what point in the process of metadata
analysis—i.e., acquisition, analysis, or use 18 —must the government
secure a warrant, but also the ways in which the government may
analyze and use our metadata after acquiring it. 19 While the Supreme
Court has not directly addressed this issue, it provided some guidance
in Carpenter v. United States. 20
In Carpenter, the FBI subpoenaed 127 days of Timothy Carpenter’s
cell-site location information (“CSLI”)—metadata in the form of timestamped records containing the identification number of the cell site
that his phone was connected to at a given time—from his network
provider. 21 The Court held that “[t]he location information obtained
from Carpenter’s wireless carriers was the product of a search”; 22 thus,
the government had violated the Fourth Amendment by failing to
acquire a warrant. The Court based its holding on its reasoning in two
lines of cases. 23 The first concerns a person’s expectation of privacy in
their long-term physical movements. 24 The second concerns “a person’s
16.

United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 760 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting));
see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(“[F]or those extensive intrusions that significantly jeopardize individuals’
sense of security more than self-restraint by law enforcement officials is
required.”); Greenwald, supra note 7, at 4 (“Unless such power is held
in check by rigorous oversight and accountability, it is almost certain to
be abused.”).

17.

See generally Orin S. Kerr, When Does a Carpenter Search Start—and
When Does It Stop?, Reason: The Volokh Conspiracy (July 6, 2018, 3:34
PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2018/07/06/when-does-a-carpenter-searchstart-and-w (exploring how Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206
(2018), complicates the determination of when a search begins and ends)
[https://perma.cc/KC3G-66NY].

18.

Orin S. Kerr, Use Restrictions and the Future of Surveillance Law,
Brookings (Apr. 19, 2011), https://www.brookings.edu/research/userestrictions-and-the-future-of-surveillance-law/ [https://perma.cc/9SKNHAAN].

19.

Kerr, supra note 17; see also infra Part III.

20.

138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).

21.

Id. at 2212.

22.

Id. at 2217.

23.

Id. at 2214.

24.

Id. at 2209.
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expectation of privacy in information voluntarily turned over to third
parties.” 25 Though the Court did not directly answer the question of
when a search of metadata begins, its reasoning and the concerns it
considered provide a foundation for determining when such a search
begins. The answer to this question determines what the Fourth
Amendment protects—metadata itself, or the information that results
from its analysis—as well as how the government may use metadata it
has legally obtained.
This Note explores when a Fourth Amendment search of one’s
historical metadata begins, based on the Supreme Court’s reasoning
and concerns in Carpenter. Part I provides an overview of what
metadata is and what types of information its analysis can yield. It then
takes a closer look at CSLI—the metadata at issue in Carpenter—and
addresses the threat to privacy posed by the aggregation of large
amounts of metadata. Part II provides a close analysis of the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Carpenter. Part III discusses the various stages in
the process of metadata-based surveillance at which a Fourth Amend–
ment search could begin. It argues that, to best safeguard privacy, the
search must begin not when metadata is acquired, but when it is
analyzed to reveal private information. Part IV proposes a framework
for analyzing when a metadata search begins. Finally, Part V suggests
a reinterpretation of the Fourth Amendment’s particularity require–
ment as it pertains to historical metadata.

I. Metadata
This section explains what metadata is, the uses for which it is
collected, and what it can reveal when analyzed. It then provides an indepth explanation of CSLI—the metadata at issue in Carpenter—and
continues by describing the enormous range of private information that
can be gleaned from the analysis of aggregated metadata.
A. Types of Metadata and Its Uses

Metadata is data about data. It does not describe a commun–
ication’s or digital activity’s content, but instead it comprises inform–
ation about that communication or activity. For instance, if you call
your mother, the metadata about the call will not take the form of a
transcript of the conversation. Instead, it will contain the call’s length,
the date and time when the call took place, both the initiating and the
receiving telephone number, the cell-site identification number of the
cell tower your phone was connected to, and other logistical data.26
Basically, it is just a list of numbers. Almost every digital activity we
25.

Id.

26.

Emily Berman, When Database Queries Are Fourth Amendment Searches,
102 Minn. L. Rev. 577, 585–86 (2017).
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engage in leaves behind “rich metadata trails.” 27 And virtually every–
thing we do while browsing the Internet or using digital devices is
recorded and stored, “creating a permanent record of unparalleled
pervasiveness and depth.” 28
This collection of data about our communications and activities
may seem innocuous compared to the collection of records detailing
those communications and activities. But when our metadata trails are
analyzed, metadata can reveal an intimate picture of our lives. 29 In fact,
by virtue of metadata’s structured nature, metadata analysis can often
reveal those details more easily and cost-effectively than the content of
our communications. 30 This structure makes it easy to store and quickly
analyze vast sets of data for patterns that can reveal our “personal
details, habits, and behaviors.” 31 By contrast, to analyze the content of
a phone call, an analyst must transcribe the conversation, determine its
meaning (taking into account a multitude of factors including language
differences and code phrases), and identify relevant information. 32 The
government simply does not have the resources to perform content
analysis on the phone calls of three-hundred million Americans. 33
Although Edward Snowden’s revelations in 2013 gave rise to an
Orwellian fear of government mass-surveillance, 34 in many cases,
metadata is initially collected by private companies and only later
acquired by the government. Wireless-network providers record the
duration of their customers’ phone calls, the number of texts they send,
the numbers they call, the cell sites their phones connect to, the apps
they use, and the time they spend using the Internet. 35 Websites
“secretly track [their] custome[rs’] websurfing,” amassing “record data
about [their] ISP, computer hardware and software, the website [they]
linked from, and exactly what parts of the website [they] explored and

27.

Declaration of Professor Edward W. Felten, supra note 14, ¶ 1.

28.

Daniel J. Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy
in the Information Age 26 (2004).

29.

Declaration of Professor Edward W. Felten, supra note 14, ¶ 1.

30.

Id. ¶¶ 1, 20–21, 29 (attributing this ease and cost-effectiveness to metadata
being “stored in a predictable, standardized format”).

31.

Id. ¶ 24.

32.

Id. ¶ 28.

33.

Id. ¶ 29.

34.

Glenn Greenwald et al., Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower Behind the
NSA Surveillance Revelations, The Guardian (June 11, 2013, 9:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsawhistleblower-surveillance [https://perma.cc/2V2Y-V3VK].

35.

See infra Part I.B.
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for how long.” 36 Google acknowledges that it collects its users’ “unique
identifiers tied to the browser, application, or device [they]’re using” as
well as data concerning “the interaction of [the users’] apps, browsers,
and devices . . . , including IP address, crash reports, system activity,
and the date, time, and referrer URL.” 37 Even fitness apps track and
record metadata about their users’ health and activity. 38
These service providers generally collect this information for a
variety of business purposes. Wireless-network providers use the
metadata they collect to: (1) monitor and improve network perform–
ance; (2) deliver and maintain products and services; (3) monitor and
maintain account and billing records; (4) detect misuse and assure
security; (5) deliver marketing offers; and (6) in the case of T-Mobile,
respond to legal processes and emergencies. 39 Network providers also
aggregate this data “for a variety of purposes such as scientific and
marketing research and services.” 40 Websites use metadata to reveal
what parts of the website are most popular, how long a user’s attention
span is, what language the site should be displayed in for a particular
user, and what kinds of products a user might be interested in. 41 In
2004, in preparation for Hurricane Frances, Walmart knew to ship not
only extra flashlights to Florida’s Atlantic Coast, but also strawberry
Pop-Tarts and beer—products that Walmart’s data analysis showed
sell at up to seven times their normal rate in the period immediately
before a hurricane hits. 42

36.

Solove, supra note 28, at 23–24.

37.

Google Privacy Policy, Google (May 25, 2018), https://www.gstatic.com/
policies/privacy/pdf/20180525/853e41a3/google_privacy_policy_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BD8E-QDBC].

38.

Susan Freiwald & Stephen W. Smith, The Carpenter Chronicle: A Near
Perfect Surveillance, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 205, 230 (2018).

39.

Wireless Customer Agreement, AT&T, https://www.att.com/legal/terms.
wirelessCustomerAgreement.html#howCanIGetMobileContent [https://
perma.cc/MY96-UYTK]; Sprint Corporation Privacy Policy, Sprint,
https://www4.sprint.com/legal/privacy.html [https://perma.cc/XV4Y7X7F] (last updated Mar. 29, 2017); T-Mobile Privacy Statement, TMobile,
https://www.t-mobile.com/responsibility/privacy/tvisionprivacy-policy [https://perma.cc/NA8Q-HAFY] (last updated Oct. 1,
2019); Privacy Policy, Verizon, https://www.verizon.com/about/privacy/
full-privacy-policy [https://perma.cc/Y5CD-JKZZ] (last updated Apr. 2019).

40.

Wireless Customer Agreement, AT&T, https://www.att.com/legal/terms.
wirelessCustomerAgreement.html#howCanIGetMobileContent [https://
perma.cc/97R7-ACSA].

41.

Solove, supra note 28, at 23–24.

42.

Constance L. Hays, What Wal-Mart Knows About Customers’ Habits,
N.Y. Times (Nov. 14, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/14/
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The same metadata that private companies use to improve their
marketing and products is also valuable to the government for other
purposes, namely cost-effective and minimally invasive surveillance.43
The government often acquires metadata by wiretapping Internet
service providers, using court-ordered warrants or subpoenas, or simply
purchasing it from data brokers or directly from the websites that
collect it. 44 This metadata can be analyzed and searched to discover
more information about an identified target or “to discover the
perpetrator of a past or future event.” 45 In some cases, it reveals
information that the government could not obtain through other means,
allowing the government to “track individuals through places where it
would otherwise be uneconomical to do so, [and] even through places
where it would otherwise be effectively impossible for the government
to do so, such as within the surveillance target’s own home or office.”46
Historical metadata even allows the government to go back in time to
track a suspect. 47
B. CSLI

In Carpenter v. United States, Carpenter challenged the govern–
ment’s warrantless acquisition of his cell-site location information—the
metadata generated every time a phone connects to a cell site. Cell
phones perform most of their functions by connecting to radio antennas
owned by wireless-network providers. 48 These radio antennas and the
towers that house them are commonly referred to as “cell sites.” 49 A
business/yourmoney/what-walmart-knows-about-customers-habits.html
[https://perma.cc/P2PW-GTD9].
43.

Kerr, supra note 18, at 11–12.

44.

Bryan Bumgardner, How Are the NSA and Others Collecting and Using
Our Data?, Sci. Am. (June 20, 2013), https://www.scientificamerican.com/
article/how-are-the-nsa/ [https://perma.cc/8BTH-GQ9C]; Bruce Schneier,
Do You Want the Government Buying Your Data from Corporations?,
The Atlantic (Apr. 30, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/
archive/2013/04/do-you-want-the-government-buying-your-data-fromcorporations/275431/ [https://perma.cc/FU5W-XQXW].

45.

Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth
Amendment, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317, 322–23 (2008).

46.

Brief of Technology Experts as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
28–29, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402)
(emphasis in original).

47.

Slobogin, supra note 45, at 322–23.

48.

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211; Matthew Tart et al., Historic Cell Site
Analysis—Overview of Principles and Survey Methodologies, 8 Digital
Investigations 185, 186 (2012).

49.

Eric Pait, Find My Suspect: Tracking People in the Age of Cell Phones,
2 Geo. L. Tech. Rev. 155, 157 (2017).
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cell phone typically connects to surrounding cell sites and pushes
through data via the strongest connection, which is often, but not
always, the cell site in closest proximity to that phone. 50 As the phone
is carried from place to place, “its connection transfers from cell site to
cell site, maintaining a continuous connection with the strongest
available signal.” 51
When a cell phone connects to a cell site, it generates a timestamped record containing metadata about that connection (aka,
CSLI), which is collected and stored by the wireless-network provider
that owns the cell site. 52 CSLI includes the identification number of the
cell site (“Cell ID”) that the phone initially connected to, the date and
time the connection was made, the phone numbers involved, and often
the Cell ID of the site the phone was connected to when the call ended. 53
When analyzed, this information can reveal a cell phone’s general
location, and by proxy, its user’s location, at the time the record was
generated. 54 If enough CSLI records are analyzed, it is possible to
observe “the whole of [a person’s] physical movements.” 55

56

While wireless-network providers collect and retain CSLI for a
variety of business purposes, 57 their data-collection efforts have also
50.

Tart et al., supra note 48.

51.

Pait, supra note 49.

52.

Robinson Meyer, This Very Common Cellphone Surveillance Still Doesn’t
Require a Warrant, The Atlantic (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.
com/technology/archive/2016/04/sixth-circuit-cellphone-tracking-csliwarrant/478197/ [https://perma.cc/8K45-FNJD].

53.

Tart et al., supra note 48, at 185.

54.

Id. at 188.

55.

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018). In 2009, Malte
Spitz, a German politician, sued his wireless-network provider because it
refused to disclose to Spitz the CSLI generated by his cell phone. Tell-All
Telephone, Zeit Online, https://www.zeit.de/datenschutz/malte-spitzdata-retention [https://perma.cc/BE7S-CV2X] (last visited Aug. 29, 2019).
In settlement, Spitz received six months of metadata his wireless-network
provider had collected. Id. Together with Zeit Online, he created an
interactive map of his movements, calls, tests, and internet connectivity
revealed by analyzing the six months of metadata. Id. To get a sense of
the historical surveillance capacity of CSLI, see id.

56.

Tart et al., supra note 48, at 188.

57.

See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
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been a boon for law enforcement officials who can now determine a
suspected criminal’s present and past locations simply by analyzing the
CSLI generated by the suspect’s cell phone. 58 Because most individuals
keep their cell phones with them at all times, the analysis of this
historical CSLI can paint a detailed picture of their past movements,
information that may otherwise be unavailable to law enforcement. 59
And law enforcement taps this power frequently, requesting historical
CSLI from phone companies tens of thousands of times each year. 60
After law enforcement acquires an individual’s CSLI from a phone
company, it must analyze it “in conjunction with other information
such as survey and geographic data, to determine areas where a phone
may, or may not, have been when it was used.” 61 The first step is to
combine the CSLI with a database containing, for instance, the location
of the cell sites that correspond to the Cell IDs in the records.62 Next,
law enforcement must determine “the area over which the cell [site]
could be expected to provide service and whether or not this includes
specific locations of interest to the investigation.” 63 The precision of the
location information gleaned from CSLI is determined by the cell
coverage area, 64 which depends on a variety of factors, including “the
height of the [cell] antenna (aerial), the power used, the location of
other cells and the geography of the land (hills, trees, etc.) including
58.

Pait, supra note 49, at 158.

59.

Id. at 156, 160–61.

60.

Law enforcement is not required to keep records of how many CSLI
requests they make each year, but a rough estimation can be made based
on the transparency reports of major wireless-network providers. See
Freiwald & Smith, supra note 38, at 232. From January 2018 through
June 2018, AT&T received 42,180 demands from law enforcement for the
CSLI records of its users. AT&T, Transparency Report 4 (Aug. 2018),
https://about.att.com/ecms/dam/csr/aug2018/TransparencyReports/A
ug-2018-TransparencyReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EER-Y5VM]. In 2017,
T-Mobile received 64,266 CSLI demands. T-Mobile US Inc., Trans–
parency Report for 2017, at 6 (2017), https://www.t-mobile.com/
content/dam/t-mobile/corporate/newsroom/pages/factsheetspdf/
TransparencyReport2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/KHP2-BDMA]. See also
Verizon, Transparency Report 1H 2018, https://www.verizon.com/
about/portal/transparency-report/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/
Transparency-Report-US-21-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4CZ-3UAQ];
Sprint, Sprint Corporation Transparency Report (Jan. 2018),
https://newsroom.sprint.com/csr/content/1214/files/Transparency%20R
eport%20January%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/AN2P-PPMU] (listing
law enforcement’s demands for customer information by type of request).

61.

Tart et al., supra note 48, at 185.

62.

Id. at 187.

63.

Id.

64.

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018).
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surrounding buildings.” 65 While it is true that CSLI is not as precise as
GPS coordinates, 66 the growing demand for cell-phone data has
prompted wireless-network providers to install more and more cell sites,
resulting in smaller coverage areas for each cell site, thereby increasing
the precision of the collected location information. 67 Today, the cover–
age area of a cell site can range from twenty kilometers in rural areas
to as little as one hundred meters in densely populated areas like
shopping malls. 68
It is unclear exactly how many CSLI data points wireless-network
providers collect from a cell phone each day. But in Carpenter,
MetroPCS and Sprint together provided the government with 127 days
of CSLI from Timothy Carpenter’s phone, totaling 12,898 location
points. 69 This means that, on average, Sprint and MetroPCS collected
101 data points per day from Carpenter’s phone. 70 It is also unclear
what types of phone activity cause CSLI to be generated and stored. 71
If, however, most providers are like T-Mobile—one of the few wirelessnetwork providers that discloses the types of activities that generate
CSLI—they probably collect CSLI every time a cell phone is “turned
on, calls and text messages [are] sen[t] or receive[d] . . . , and other
data services [are] use[d].” 72
C. The Aggregation Problem

Most metadata can be analyzed in various ways to produce different
types of information. A single CSLI record, for example, could be analy–
zed in one way to reveal the user’s general location at the time she
placed a call, and in another way to reveal who she called. But the risk
that the government might analyze metadata to reveal information it
did not originally seek is exacerbated by the aggregation problem.
While discrete pieces of metadata can reveal highly private information,

65.

Tart et al., supra note 48, at 186.

66.

United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 889 (6th Cir. 2016), rev’d and
remanded, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).

67.

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211–12.

68.

Tart et al., supra note 48, at 186.

69.

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.

70.

Id.

71.

When I contacted AT&T on January 4, 2019, seeking my own CSLI, I
was told that AT&T’s technical division could not provide me with that
data due to its “sensitive nature,” nor would AT&T forward my request
to its legal department without a “subpoena or legal document.”

72.

T-Mobile Privacy Statement, T-Mobile, https://www.t-mobile.com/
responsibility/privacy/privacy-policy [https://perma.cc/EC7B-6HYK] (last
updated Oct. 1, 2019).
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aggregated metadata can expose much more. 73 When metadata is
amassed in large quantities and analyzed, patterns and correlations
start to emerge. 74 And those patterns can reveal information that is
fundamentally different from what could be gleaned through isolated,
relatively innocuous pieces of metadata. 75
By analyzing aggregated call records, the government can create a
detailed map of a person’s social network, including his or her friends,
family, colleagues, psychiatrists, insurance providers, doctors, baby–
sitters, lawyers, and so on. 76 These records can reveal not only who
someone calls, but the nature of the caller’s relationship with the call’s
recipient. 77 People who call each other every week likely have a closer
relationship than those who speak only once a year. 78 Two people who
frequently call each other late at night might be in a relationship; if
they stop calling, the relationship has probably ended. 79 If two people
talk only between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., they likely have a prof–
essional relationship. Metadata can even reveal people’s relative power
and social status. The Economist noted that “[p]eople at the top of the
office or social pecking order often receive quick callbacks, do not worry
about calling other people late at night and tend to get more calls at
times when social events are most often organi[z]ed, such as Friday
afternoons.” 80 This analysis reveals information about not only the
person being surveilled, but also about people who were never the
intended targets of that surveillance. 81
Highly personal information can also be discovered by analyzing a
sequence of calls in context. 82 Edward Felten, Deputy U.S. Chief
Technology Officer during the Obama Administration, 83 provides the
following illustration:
73.

Declaration of Professor Edward W. Felten, supra note 14, ¶ 39.

74.

Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment,
89 Wash. L. Rev. 35, 42 (2014).

75.

Berman, supra note 26, at 579.

76.

Declaration of Professor Edward W. Felten, supra note 14, ¶ 48.

77.

Id. ¶¶ 49–50.

78.

Id. ¶ 49.

79.

Id.

80.

Untangling the Social Web, The Economist (Sept. 4, 2010),
https://www.economist.com/technology-quarterly/2010/09/04/untanglingthe-social-web [https://perma.cc/7SKF-9FFB].

81.

Declaration of Professor Edward W. Felten, supra note 14, ¶ 24.

82.

Id. ¶ 52.

83.

Megan Smith & Alexander MacGillivray, The White House Names Dr.
Ed Felten as Deputy U.S. Chief Technology Officer, The White House:
Blog (May 11, 2015, 2:00 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/
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A young woman calls her gynecologist; then immediately calls her
mother; then a man who, during the past few months, she had
repeatedly spoken to on the telephone after 11pm; followed by a
call to a family planning center that also offers abortions. A likely
storyline emerges that would not be as evident by examining the
record of a single telephone call. 84

Location metadata, too, can reveal deeply private information
“because of the common sense observation that individuals often go to
particular locations for particular purposes.” 85 A person’s location met–
adata that contains repeat visits to a particular church every Sunday
morning might reveal his religion. Another’s metadata containing
regular visits to that same church every Tuesday evening might reveal
that he is attending an addiction-support group.
In Carpenter, the Court acknowledged that a person may have a
greater expectation of privacy in her aggregated location information
because of the power that aggregation has to reveal information that
would be otherwise unavailable. 86 Aggregation can reveal information
that a surveillance target never made a conscious decision to share;
information that once could have been acquired only by examining the
content of a person’s communications; 87 information that, if stored in a
physical form, the government could acquire only with a warrant.

II. What Carpenter Told Us
Carpenter is the first Supreme Court case to address an individual’s
Fourth Amendment rights with regard to historical metadata. In
holding that the government must obtain a warrant to “access[] hist–
orical cell phone records that provide a comprehensive chronicle of the
user’s past movements,” 88 the Court broke new ground in ensuring
individuals’ digital privacy. This Part discusses the facts of Carpenter
and the analysis the Supreme Court used to determine that individuals
have a legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to their aggregated
CSLI.

2015/05/11/white-house-names-dr-ed-felten-deputy-us-chief-technologyofficer [https://perma.cc/S3ZU-7KS5].
84.

Declaration of Professor Edward W. Felten, supra note 14, ¶ 52.

85.

Brief of Technology Experts as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra
note 46, at 29 (emphasis in original).

86.

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219, 2232 (2018).

87.

Declaration of Professor Edward W. Felten, supra note 14, ¶ 39.

88.

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211.
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A. The Facts

In 2011, the Detroit Police Department arrested four people it
suspected of breaking into a series of Radio Shack and T-Mobile stores
in Michigan and Ohio. 89 One of the suspects admitted that the group
had robbed nine different stores over a four-month period. 90 After
confessing, the suspect provided the FBI with the names and cell-phone
numbers of fifteen other individuals who he claimed were accomplices
in one or more of those robberies. 91 Timothy Ivory Carpenter was one
of those named individuals. 92 Based on the suspect’s information, the
prosecutors sought court orders under the Stored Communications Act
to acquire 152 days of Carpenter’s CSLI from his wireless-network
providers. 93 The Stored Communications Act requires only that the
prosecutor presents “specific and articulable facts showing that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that . . . the records . . . sought
are relevant and material to an ongoing investigation.” 94 Finding that
this standard had been met, a magistrate judge issued two orders to
produce Carpenter’s CSLI. 95
The first order directed MetroPCS, Carpenter’s network-service
provider, to hand over 152 days of his CSLI. The second directed Sprint,
the network Carpenter’s phone had connected to for a week while it
was “roaming” in northeastern Ohio, to hand over seven days of CSLI.
The CSLI sought included “call detail records . . . [and] cell site info–
rmation from the target telephones at call origination and at call
termination for incoming and outgoing calls.” 96 In response, MetroPCS
produced 127 days of records. Sprint produced two. 97 All told, the
government obtained 12,898 CSLI data points tracing Carpenter’s
movements over the course of more than four months. 98 In addition to
the CSLI itself, MetroPCS and Sprint provided the locations and other
details of each of their cell sites in Michigan and Ohio, including the
89.

Id. at 2212.

90.

Id.

91.

Id.

92.

Id.

93.

Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).

94.

18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).

95.

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.

96.

Brief for Petitioner at 3–4, Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (No. 16-402); see
also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212 (explaining that the magistrate judges
issued orders directing Carpenter’s cellular carriers to disclose the cell-site
information for his phone during the four-month period of the robberies).

97.

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.

98.

Id.
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longitude, latitude, physical address, and directional orientation of each
antenna. 99 By cross-referencing Carpenter’s CSLI with the cell-site
information, the government was able to connect Carpenter’s cell
phone’s physical location to four of the robberies. 100
The government charged Carpenter with six counts of aiding and
abetting a robbery in violation of the Hobbs Act. 101 Before trial, Carp–
enter moved to suppress the cell-site evidence on the ground that the
government violated the Fourth Amendment by obtaining his CSLI
records without a warrant supported by probable cause. 102 The district
court rejected that argument, accepting the government’s position that
Carpenter had no legitimate expectation of privacy in his CSLI because
it served merely as a “proxy for [his] visually observable locat–
ion . . . along public highways.” 103 The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding
that individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in cell-phone
location records because they qualified as business records obtained
from a third party. 104 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
Carpenter had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell-site
records. 105
B. The Supreme Court’s Reasoning

Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts declared that “[a]s
technology has enhanced the Government’s capacity to encroach upon
areas normally guarded from inquisitive eyes, this Court has sought to
‘assure[ ] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that
existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.’” 106 This principle
has guided the evolution of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment as the technological revolution has progressed. 107
The Chief Justice observed that, traditionally, the Court’s interpre–
tation of the Fourth Amendment has been “tied to common-law tres–
99.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (No. 16402).

100. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212–13.
101. See id. at 2212; 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012).
102. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
103. United States v. Carpenter, No. 12-20218, 2013 WL 6385838, at *2 (E.D.
Mich. Dec. 6, 2013), aff’d, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016), rev’d and
remanded, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
104. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888–89 (6th Cir. 2016); see also
infra Part II.C.2.
105. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
106. Id. at 2214 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)
(alteration in original)).
107. Id. at 2213–14.
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pass and focused on whether the Government obtains information by
physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area.” 108 But the
Court severed this tie between property rights and privacy rights in
Katz v. United States. 109 In Katz, the government attached a recording
device to the outside of a public telephone booth that Katz used to
transmit wagering information and submitted the recordings of Katz’s
side of the conversation as evidence at trial. 110 The government argued
that the booth was not a constitutionally protected area; and even if it
was, the recording device did not physically penetrate the phone
booth. 111
The Court rejected those arguments, holding that intruding on a
defendant’s physical property is not necessary to invoke the Fourth
Amendment because “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places.” 112 In so holding, the Court created a reasonable-expectation-ofprivacy standard that redefined the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s
protection. In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan articulated a twopart test to define what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy:
(1) the person must have an actual, subjective expectation of privacy;
and (2) that expectation must be “one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’” 113 Justice Harlan’s test has been widely
adopted by subsequent courts, 114 which have measured objective reaso–
nableness by “historical understandings ‘of what was deemed an
unreasonable search and seizure when [the Fourth Amendment] was
adopted.’” 115
After establishing that Katz provides the relevant standard, Chief
Justice Roberts noted that two lines of cases emerged from Katz that
were applicable in Carpenter. 116 The first concerns “a person’s expect–
ation of privacy in his physical location and movements.” 117 The second

108. Id. at 2213.
109. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
110. Id. at 348.
111. Id. at 351–52.
112. Id. at 350–51.
113. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
114. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001); Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1979).
115. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213–14 (2018) (quoting
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (alteration in original)).
116. Id. at 2214–15.
117. Id. at 2215.
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concerns whether a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy in
information he has shared with a third party. 118
1. Expectation of Privacy in Physical Location and Movements

In the first line of cases, the Court considered its prior holding in
United States v. Knotts 119 and the concurring opinions in United States
v. Jones. 120 In Knotts, the government suspected Knotts and his codefendants, Petschen and Armstrong, of manufacturing illicit drugs
after the M3 Company, a chemical manufacturer, reported to the police
that Armstrong—one of its employees—had been stealing chemicals
that could be used to manufacture illicit drugs. 121 Visual surveillance of
Armstrong revealed that he continued to purchase the same type of
chemicals from another local chemical company after the M3 Company
terminated him. 122 With the chemical company’s consent, officers
installed a radio beeper—a device that emits periodic radio signals that
can be picked up with a receiver—in a drum of chloroform later
purchased by Armstrong. 123 The officers then used both the beeper and
visual surveillance to tail Armstrong and Petschen to Knotts’s property,
where the drugs were being manufactured. 124 The Court rejected
Knotts’s Fourth Amendment claim, stating that he had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements over public thoroughfares.125
Similarly, in Jones, the government, without a valid warrant,
attached a GPS monitor to the undercarriage of Jones’s Jeep. 126 The
government argued that attaching the GPS monitor was the equivalent
of the beeper in Knotts, and that Jones had “no reasonable expectation
of privacy . . . in the locations of the Jeep on public roads, which were
visible to all.” 127 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia determined that
Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights had been violated because the
government “occupied private property [the undercarriage of Jones’s
Jeep] for the purpose of obtaining information.” 128 In doing so, the
government’s action fell under the traditional property-based approach
118. Id. at 2216.
119. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
120. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
121. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 278–79.
125. Id. at 281–82.
126. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402–03 (2012).
127. Id. at 406.
128. Id. at 404.
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to Fourth Amendment analysis. 129 Though Justice Scalia acknowledged
the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, he concluded that Katz
did not overrule the traditional property-based analysis, but added an
additional method of analysis. 130
Even though all nine justices joined in Justice Scalia’s holding that
the government had violated the Fourth Amendment, Justice Soto–
mayor (writing for herself) and Justice Alito (joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan) wrote separately, advocating that the
Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test was the proper standard.
Both Justice Sotomayor and Justice Alito argued that individuals have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical
movements, and that “longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of
most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.” 131 Justice Soto–
mayor and Justice Alito observed that, while Jones’s location had been
gleaned by intruding on Jones’s private property, a Fourth Amendment
violation would have occurred even if the government had not used
technology necessitating such an intrusion. 132
Justice Sotomayor acknowledged that when amassed, location
information can reveal intimate details about a person’s life—including
“their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on”—that
could not be learned by examining an individual’s location through
short-term surveillance. 133 Accordingly, she argued that individuals
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their long-term physical
location. 134 Justice Alito, in turn, noted that historically, privacy
protections were often practical as much as constitutional. 135 He
explained that as technology advances and makes increasingly pervasive
surveillance more practical, measuring the scope of Fourth Amendment
protections using a reasonable-expectation-of-privacy standard is
necessary to protect people from unreasonable government intrusion.136
In Carpenter, the majority employed the logic of Justice Sotomayor
and Justice Alito’s Jones opinions to hold that the broad scope of the
location information acquired by the government violated Carpenter’s
reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of his physical
movements. 137 The Court emphasized that the ease of CSLI’s acquis–
129. Id. at 405.
130. Id. at 409.
131. Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 414–15; id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 415–16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 429–30.
137. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018).
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ition and analysis, its aggregation over a four-month period, and its
retrospective quality were all factors indicating that Fourth Amend–
ment protection should apply. 138
2. Expectation of Privacy in Information Shared with Third Parties

In the second line of cases, the Court considered whether
individuals retain an expectation of privacy in information they share
with third parties. In the first of those cases, United States v. Miller,139
the government subpoenaed Miller’s bank records after he was
suspected of defrauding the government of whiskey taxes. 140 The Court
applied the Katz test and held that Miller had no reasonable expect–
ation of privacy in his bank records because the records were
“negotiable instruments,” not private papers. 141 By revealing those
instruments to the bank, a third party, Miller assumed the risk that
they might be shared with the government. 142 This idea became known
as the “third-party doctrine,” whereby an individual does not maintain
an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in information they
voluntarily share with a third party. 143
Three years later, in Smith v. Maryland, 144 the Court again applied
the third-party doctrine. Smith claimed that the warrantless install–
ation of a pen register—a device that records the telephone numbers
dialed from a particular phone—in his telephone company’s central
office to record the numbers he dialed was a violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights. 145 But, applying the Katz analysis, the Court
expressed doubt that individuals subjectively expect that the numbers
they dial are private. 146 Even if Smith had subjectively believed that
the numbers were private, the Court determined that this expectation
was not objectively reasonable because by voluntarily sharing the
numbers with the telephone company, Smith forfeited his reasonable
expectation of privacy. 147

138. Id. at 2217–20.
139. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
140. Id. at 436.
141. Id. at 442.
142. Id. at 440, 442–43.
143. Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment § 2.7(c) (5th ed. 2012).
144. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
145. Id. at 737, 741.
146. Id. at 742.
147. Id. at 743–44.

205

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 1·2019
What Carpenter Tells Us About Metadata Searches

In its decision not to apply the third-party doctrine in Carpenter,
the Court noted that “Smith and Miller . . . did not rely solely on the
act of sharing. Instead, they considered ‘the nature of the particular
documents sought’ to determine whether ‘there is a legitimate “expect–
ation of privacy” concerning their contents.’” 148 The Court determined
that, despite being in the possession of a third party, CSLI is not
“shared” in the normal sense because the decision to share CSLI is not
conscious or voluntary. 149 The Court reasoned that cell-phone use is
“‘such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life’ that carrying one is
indispensable to participation in modern society.” 150 Furthermore, cell
phones record CSLI as a “dint of their operation, without any affirm–
ative act on the part of the user beyond powering up.” 151 As Justice
Sotomayor observed in Jones, the third-party doctrine may require
reconsideration in this digital age so as not to make secrecy “a prereq–
uisite for privacy.” 152 The Carpenter Court seems to have agreed; its
interpretation of the third-party doctrine represents a significant
narrowing of the doctrine’s scope. 153
3. What Carpenter Tells Us About When the Search Begins

While the Carpenter Court told us that “the information obtained
from Carpenter’s wireless carriers was the product of a search,” it did
not tell us at what point that search began. 154 The Court alternated
between the terms “access” and “acquire” to refer to the government’s
actions. 155 Its use of those terms provides little guidance, however, as
the Court used the terms interchangeably, yet seemingly assigned them
distinct, undefined meanings. Even so, the Court’s rationales and
considerations provide an excellent foundation for determining when a
search of metadata begins.

148. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018) (quoting United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976)).
149. Id. at 2220.
150. Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014)).
151. Id.
152. 565 U.S. at 417–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
153. Freiwald & Smith, supra note 38, at 224.
154. 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
155. Kerr, supra note 17.
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III. Stages of Digital Surveillance Using Metadata
and a Result-Oriented Application of Fourth
Amendment Metadata Analysis
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment is “to safeguard the privacy and security of
individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials.” 156 As
such, Fourth Amendment analyses must evolve to “assure[] preserv–
ation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when
the Fourth Amendment was adopted.” 157 This Part describes the
various stages at which a Fourth Amendment search could be said to
begin regarding metadata-based surveillance. Furthermore, this Part
argues that an acquisition-based model—determining that the search
begins when the government obtains metadata—would often be insuff–
icient to safeguard privacy in the digital age. At least where most
historical metadata are concerned, privacy is better protected by a
result-oriented model—finding that a search begins when metadata is
analyzed to reveal meaningful information, not when raw metadata is
acquired by the government.
There are several basic stages of digital surveillance at which a
search could begin: (1) data collection, (2) data analysis, (3) disclosure
to a person of the results of analysis, and (4) public disclosure. 158 The
first stage, data collection, occurs when the government acquires data
by accessing and copying it. 159 In Carpenter, this occurred when the
wireless-network provider sent a copy of Carpenter’s unanalyzed CSLI
records to law enforcement.
The second stage, data analysis, occurs when the government
manipulates the data it has acquired to “achieve particular goals.”160
This manipulation commonly involves transferring the data to a
database and combining it with another database in a way that gives
meaning to and contextualizes the original data. 161 At this stage, the
data are manipulated by a computer and neither the data nor the
results of its analysis are viewed by a human analyst. 162 CSLI is manip–
ulated first by aggregating it into a database then combining that
database with a second set of data containing the location of, and other
156. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213.
157. Id. at 2214 (alteration in original) (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 34 (2001)).
158. Kerr, supra note 18.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.; Kerr, supra note 17.
162. Kerr, supra note 18.
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information about, the cell sites that correspond to the Cell IDs in the
CSLI. 163
The third stage, disclosure to a person, occurs when “an individual
with proper access to the database receives the fruits of the [prior] data
collection and [analysis].” 164 An analyst can do this by searching or
querying the machine-manipulated data to access information in an
intelligible form. 165 Using CSLI, this step occurs when the analyst
queries the combined CSLI and the informational databases to create a
map of the user’s historical location. 166
The final stage of the metadata-surveillance process, public disclos–
ure, occurs when the government discloses or uses the information it
has gleaned from the data. 167 In Carpenter, this occurred when the
government presented at trial the location evidence derived from
Carpenter’s historical CSLI records. 168
Traditionally, a search for tangible evidence stored in physical
space begins when the government breaches a private space where it
believes the evidence is stored. 169 “The reasons for this focus are largely
historical”: 170 the framers were concerned with limiting the
government’s power to intrude upon and seize private citizens and their
property. Thus, “[t]he Fourth Amendment was enacted to limit the
government’s ability to break into homes and other private spaces in
order to take away private property. Breaking into the home was a
search. Taking away property was a seizure.” 171 But generally, there is
no private space breached when conducting a metadata search because
most metadata is stored on third-party-owned servers. So at what stage
in the metadata-based surveillance does the equivalent of a breach
occur?
The intuitive answer is that the search begins at stage one: data
acquisition. 172 Requiring the government to procure a warrant before it
acquires metadata would mean that the government could not secretly
amass huge stores of metadata. This idea is highly appealing in light of

163. See Tart et al., supra note 48, at 185.
164. Kerr, supra note 18, at 7.
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., Tell-all Telephone, supra note 55.
167. Kerr, supra note 18.
168. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212–13 (2018).
169. Kerr, supra note 18.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See Kerr, supra note 17.
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the government’s vast data-collection capacity. 173 If the government
does not possess data, it cannot misuse it. 174 But a result-oriented
approach will ultimately better protect our privacy because it is not
until step three—when the data are given meaning through analysis
and exposure to human eyes—that metadata reveals private infor–
mation. If a search begins when a person’s reasonable expectation of
privacy is infringed upon, 175 then it is not until step three that the
search beings.
Two considerations support this view. First, acquiring metadata
does not violate personal security in the same way a physical search
does. The government entering a person’s home is highly invasive.
Acquiring metadata from a person’s wireless-network provider is more
innocuous because, to most people, that metadata is facially meaning–
less; only after the metadata is analyzed does it reveal private inform–
ation. For example, CSLI is comprised of numbers that are meaningless
without analysis. 176 A map of a person’s historical location does not
emerge until the Cell IDs in CSLI are cross-referenced with information
about the geographic area served by the corresponding cell sites. 177
Thus, a person’s sense of security and privacy is violated only by the
information the government obtains after its analysis, not by the
information’s initial acquisition.
The second consideration involves determining when the search
ends. In Illinois v. Andreas, 178 the Supreme Court found that “once
police are lawfully in a position to observe an item first-hand, its
owner’s privacy interest in that item is lost.” 179 The Court’s logic
supports the idea that once the government is in legal possession of
information, it need not obtain further warrants to use that information
in other ways or for other purposes. But this poses a distinct privacy
risk because analyzing metadata in different ways and in different
combinations can result in different information than that which the
metadata was originally acquired to reveal. 180 Indeed, the Carpenter
Court emphasized that its reasoning rested at least in part on the fact
that CSLI is “detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled.” 181 But
an individual’s privacy is better protected from the government’s
173. See Greenwald et al., supra note 34 (discussing the reveal of NSA’s
extensive surveillance).
174. See id.
175. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
176. See, e.g., Tart et al., supra note 48 and accompanying image.
177. See supra Part I.B.
178. 463 U.S. 765 (1983).
179. Id. at 771.
180. See supra Part I.C.
181. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018).
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repeated and varied use of her information if the government can only
acquire her metadata without a warrant; if the government wants to
analyze it in a particular way, it must get a warrant for that specific
purpose.

IV. When the Search of Metadata Begins: A
Framework for Analysis
To pinpoint when a search of historical metadata begins, and at
what point the government must acquire a warrant to analyze that
data, an analytical framework is necessary for determining when an
invasion of privacy occurs. While Carpenter does not enumerate all the
types of private information that the Fourth Amendment protects (nor
does this Note attempt to do so), it does provide the basic framework
for analyzing when the search of metadata begins.
A. Identifying the Information Sought

The first step in determining at what stage of surveillance a search
of metadata begins is to determine what is ultimately being sought by
law enforcement. Two possibilities are that law enforcement is after (1)
the metadata itself, or (2) the information produced by analyzing that
metadata.
Using an acquisition-based model, one would have expected the
Carpenter Court to have asked whether Carpenter had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his CSLI itself because that was what the
government acquired from Carpenter’s wireless-network provider. But
the Court did not phrase its question in those terms. Instead, it asked
whether Carpenter had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole
of his physical movements. 182 This question is striking because it is
focused on the information—Carpenter’s historical location over a
period of time—that results from the government’s analysis, not the
raw metadata. The Court’s phrasing suggests that Carpenter’s privacy
was infringed upon (and thus the search began) not when the
government acquired his raw CSLI metadata, but when the govern–
ment’s analysis of his CSLI yielded information about the whole of his
physical movements. 183
This result-oriented approach makes sense for two reasons. First,
determining whether unanalyzed CSLI is protected by a reasonable
expectation of privacy is an abstract and difficult inquiry. Most physical
privacy concerns are intuitive, but generally this is not the case in the
digital context. For most people, the idea of law enforcement acquiring
a set of numbers generated by their cell phones is not as worrisome as
law enforcement entering their homes without permission. Home
invasion is concrete; numbers are abstract. Metadata’s abstraction is
182. Id. at 2217.
183. Id. at 2218–19.
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likely responsible for most people’s (including the judiciary’s) lack of
understanding about what information can actually be gleaned from
those numbers. That lack of understanding, in turn, blurs the line
between privacy in the traditional sense and privacy in the modern,
digital era.
Second, most metadata can be analyzed in various ways to produce
different types of information, not all of which may be subject to the
same expectations of privacy. 184 For example, the CSLI generated when
one makes a call typically includes the date and time the call was
initiated, the phone numbers of the persons making and receiving the
call, and the Cell ID of the cell sites to which the phone is connected.185
This information can be analyzed to show the historical location of the
cell-phone user and all the people that user called. 186 While the Jones
and Carpenter Courts held that people have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the whole of their physical movements, in Smith v.
Maryland, the Court held that individuals do not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers they dial. 187 So
although CSLI used to determine a user’s location is protected by the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, that same metadata is not
protected if it is used to determine the user’s network of associations.
Asking what information is being sought as a result of metadata
analysis remedies both problems. It is a concrete inquiry informed by
years of social expectations upon which we can make the determination
about whether metadata is subject to and protected by a reasonable
expectation of privacy. It also allows us to distinguish between permis–
sible and impermissible uses of metadata. Based on the Carpenter
Court’s phrasing, the government is free to collect and store raw
metadata, but it must acquire a warrant if it hopes to analyze that
metadata to glean information that is subject to a reasonable expect–
ation of privacy.
B. Determining Whether That Information is Subject to a Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy

The second step in determining at what stage of surveillance a
search of metadata begins is to determine whether the information
sought by the government is subject to a reasonable expectation of
privacy and, therefore, protected by the Fourth Amendment. The Katz
test asks whether a person has both a subjective and objective expect–
ation of privacy in the thing being searched. 188 “The first part of the
184. Berman, supra note 26, at 590.
185. See supra Part I.B.
186. Tart et al., supra note 48, at 185.
187. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
188. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Katz test requires only that [a person] have exhibited an expectation of
privacy—in other words, that his conduct [has] demonstrated an
intention to keep [his] activities and things . . . private, and that he
did not knowingly expose them to open view of the public.” 189 But the
Supreme Court’s decisions leading up to Carpenter have raised doubt
regarding whether a defendant’s subjective expectations are relevant in
determining whether a defendant’s expectation of privacy is a
reasonable one. In the Court’s cases leading up to Carpenter, it seems
to have abandoned or give serious consideration to the subjective
prong. 190 The Carpenter majority, too, declined to consider Carpenter’s
subjective expectations, indicating that this oft-recited requirement is
no longer relevant. 191
The second part of the Katz test—whether the expectation of
privacy at issue is “one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable’” 192—is more complex. In United States v. White, 193 Justice
Harlan explained that “[t]his question must . . . be answered by
assessing the nature of a particular practice and the likely extent of its
impact on the individual’s sense of security balanced against the utility
of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement.” 194 He went on to
explain that “intrusions that significantly jeopardize the sense of
security which is the paramount concern of Fourth Amendment
liberties” are subject to Fourth Amendment protection. 195 This determ–
ination largely depends on judges’ normative values. 196 But the
Carpenter and Jones Courts have taken steps to ground that inquiry
by emphasizing that Fourth Amendment protection should be based on

189. LaFave, supra note 143, § 2.1(c).
190. See Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective
Expectations, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 113, 113, 115 (2015) (explaining that
the subjective requirement has largely become “phantom doctrine”); see
also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32–35 (reciting the two prongs of the reasonableexpectation-of-privacy test, but only applying the objective prong); Jones,
565 U.S. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (same); id. at 423 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (quoting the Katz majority’s holding without mentioning
Justice Harlan’s subjective requirement); Riley, 573 U.S. at 381 (not
mentioning the subjective requirement and declaring simply that “the
ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness’”).
191. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206.
192. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
193. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
194. Id. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 786–87.
196. Freiwald & Smith, supra note 38, at 221.
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“historical understandings ‘of what was deemed an unreasonable search
and seizure when [the Fourth Amendment] was adopted.’” 197
And so, if a judge finds that a defendant’s expectation of privacy
does not satisfy the Katz test, the government would not need a warrant
to analyze the defendant’s metadata—the analysis would reveal only
unprotected information. But if a judge determines that the information
is subject to Fourth Amendment protection, the government must
acquire a warrant prior to such analysis.
C. An Exception to the Result-Oriented Model and How the Third-Party
Doctrine Applies

The Carpenter Court held that the third-party doctrine is not
applicable to CSLI because CSLI is not truly voluntarily shared by a
cell-phone user, rather it is generated purely as a function of using a
cell phone. 198 But the Court conflated the claim that a cell-phone user
voluntarily shares raw metadata by agreeing to a cell-phone contract
with the more dubious claim that a cell-phone user voluntarily shares
the whole of her physical location just by using her cell phone. By
signing a cell-phone contract, users consent to their network providers
both collecting phone-use metadata and using that metadata for
various, vaguely phrased purposes enumerated in the contract. 199 But
because no cell-phone contract informs a cell-phone user that their cell
phone’s metadata can be recorded and analyzed, a user cannot be said
to have voluntarily shared that information. 200 It follows that the
government may collect and store raw, unanalyzed metadata without a
warrant because that metadata is subject to the third-party doctrine;
but it may not analyze that metadata to reveal information that was
not voluntarily revealed because the third-party doctrine does not apply
to that information.
Most metadata about a particular person is generated and stored
by third parties, but in the rare case the metadata is collected by the
individual whom the data concerns—and is stored on her private
servers—the search would begin when the government acquires that
197. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (alteration in
original) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925)).
198. Id. at 2220.
199. The terms of cell-phone contracts acknowledge that the wireless-network
provider collects metadata from cell phones and uses it for various
business purposes, but those uses do not include a surveillance-type
analysis of that data that may reveal the whole of a person’s historical
movements or her network of associations. As such, it is problematic to
suggest that the user has voluntarily shared this information and that she
is subject to disclosure under the third-party doctrine. See supra notes
39–40 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
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data. In this situation, the third-party doctrine simply does not apply,
even to the raw metadata, because the information has not been shared
with a third party. Furthermore, although the information in question
is stored digitally, it is stored in a private space, and intruding into
that space would constitute an invasion of an individual’s traditional
trespass-based right to privacy. 201

V. What the Warrant Must Contain
If a Fourth Amendment search of metadata begins when it is
analyzed to reveal meaningful information, it is necessary to reinterpret
the warrant requirements—what it means to “particularly describ[e] the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized” 202—in the
context of metadata. First, when analyzing metadata, there is often no
physical “place” or “thing” where the search occurs. Nevertheless,
something is being searched. Traditionally, the place to be searched
presumably contains the subject of the search. The same is true for
metadata. Just as one enters a house through the front door, one
“enters” metadata through analysis.
Second, “things to be seized” must be similarly interpreted to
include the private information sought by analyzing the metadata. In
recent years, courts have frequently interpreted digital information to
fall within the scope of the Fourth Amendment. In 2010, the Sixth
Circuit described email as “the technological scion of tangible mail.”203
In 2014, the Supreme Court in Riley v. California 204 held that the police,
without a warrant, may not search the contents of a cell phone
belonging to a person in police custody. 205 The Court compared search–
ing the digital contents of a cell phone to “rummag[ing] at will among
a person’s private effects.” 206 Understanding “things to be searched” to
include categories of private information that can be generated by
analyzing metadata is only the next step in the evolution of the Fourth
Amendment in the modern electronic age.
In sum, a warrant acquired to analyze metadata in a way that will
likely reveal information subject to Fourth Amendment protection must
particularly describe both the metadata to be analyzed and the private
information to be seized.
201. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (2012) (“[T]he Katz reasonableexpectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the
common-law trespassory test.”) (emphasis in original).
202. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
203. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286 (6th Cir. 2010).
204. 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
205. Id. at 403.
206. Id. at 399 (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2008)).
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Conclusion
Technology is evolving at a rapid pace, and with it the
government’s surveillance capabilities. “[A]s late as 1900, [law
enforcement] involved little more than an able-bodied man who was
given a hickory club, a whistle, and a key to a call box.” 207 Today, law
enforcement can click a button and, through metadata analysis,
retroactively surveil anyone who uses technology. Determining that a
Fourth Amendment search begins when the government analyzes meta–
data, rather than when it acquires that data, is the best means of
protecting the privacy and security guaranteed by the Fourth Amend–
ment.
It is true that this result-oriented framework is broad and would
require the government to seek a greater number of warrants when
conducting historical metadata-based surveillance. But the resultoriented framework is crucial if the Fourth Amendment is to adequately
protect people from an improper governmental search. Under this
approach, individuals would retain their privacy interest in information
that might otherwise be revealed by analyzing their metadata because
the government would be required to apply for a new warrant for each
different type of protected information it seeks—even after the police
legally acquired that metadata. 208 Only after obtaining a new warrant
could the government aggregate and reaggregate metadata to reveal
additional private information protected by the Fourth Amendment.
For, as Justice White observed in United States v. Karo, 209 “[t]he
argument that a warrant requirement would oblige the government to
obtain warrants in a large number of cases is hardly a compelling
argument against the requirement.” 210 Indeed, this increased burden is
required to preserve the security and privacy of individuals against
unreasonable government invasion; and it is a small price for law
enforcement to pay in exchange for access to citizens’ personal
information that is inexpensive, “effortlessly compiled,” 211 and “other–
wise unknowable.” 212

207. Joh, supra note 74, at 36.
208. Cf. Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771–72 (1983) (explaining how the
plain-view doctrine normally permits objects lawfully within police
possession to be searched because the privacy interest has already been
lost).
209. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
210. Id. at 718.
211. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018).
212. Id. at 2218.
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